Can leniency in a rabbinic doubt extend to a related doubt involving Torah law?
The article presents Maharsham's approach: when a Torah scroll retains its presumption of validity for ordinary reading, that presumption can also extend to readings treated here as Torah obligations. Pri Megadim's suggestion concerning a Torah-level doubt arising from a rabbinic doubt is cited in support. The author challenges an automatic extension of the leniency and proposes an explanation only within Rambam's approach; the difficulty under Rashba's approach remains unresolved.
The source brings differing opinions.
Quote from the source«דהואיל ועיקר הספק בדבריהם לקולא, הוא הדין אם יוצא ממנו ספק תורה, אפשר דלא גזרו אספיקן»
- Author
- הרה"ג ר' יעקב יהודה דאוויד
- Source
- עלים — עלים — alim-vayaitzei-5787-aleh-zayis email — Vayeitzei 5787, p. 1
- Parsha
- Vayetzei