How do the laws of doubt show that the prohibition of niddah to her husband differs from ritual impurity?
According to the cited explanation of Tosafot’s position, a doubtful Torah prohibition is forbidden only by rabbinic law, whereas doubtful impurity in a private domain is treated stringently by Torah law itself. Even according to the view that a doubtful Torah prohibition requires stringency by Torah law, a double doubt permits leniency, unlike impurity in a private domain. Thus, the leniency under discussion concerns the woman’s prohibition to her husband, rather than her status under the laws of ritual purity.
The source brings differing opinions.
Quote from the source«הא דספק ספיקא לקולא (באיסור, משא"כ בטומאה) מוכיח שגם ספק אחד משנה את מציאות הענין.»
- Author
- כ"ק אדמו"ר שליט"א
- Source
- Hagahos HaRebbe — 5715-03 י"ט כסלו תשט"ו, p. 8